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Abstract
I propose creation of a venture bank, able to multiply the capital of a venture capital firm by 
at least 47 times, without requiring access to the Federal Reserve or other central bank apart from 
settlement. This concept rests on insuring loans in order to create the capital required, and expand 
Tier 1 and 2 base capital. Profitability depends on overall portfolio performance, availability of 
default insurance notes, cost of default insurance, and the multiple of original capital (MOC) 
adopted by the venture bank.
I propose a new derivative financial instrument, the Default Insurance Note (DIN), to insure 
loans to venture investments. A DIN is similar to a credit default swap (CDS) but with a host of 
unique features. The features and operation of these new derivative instruments are outlined along
with audit requirements. This instrument would be traded on open-outcry exchanges with special 
rules to ensure orderly operation of the market. It is the creation of public markets for DINs that 
makes possible the use of public market pricing to indirectly establish a market capitalization for 
the underlying venture-bank investment, which is the key to achieving regulatory acceptance of 
the fully-insured version of this proposal. That fully-insured version insulates the venture-bank 
from losses in most situations, and multiplies profitability quite dramatically in all scenarios. Ten 
year returns above 10X are attainable. 
I further propose a new feature for insurance type derivatives which is a clawback lien, here 
77%, to be paid back to the underwriter to prevent perverse incentive. 
This proposal solves an old problem in banking, because it matches the term of the loan with 
the term of the investment. 
I show that both the venture investment and the DIN underwriting business are profitable. 
Keywords: Venture capital, angel investors, seed investors, derivatives. 
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1 Introduction
Venture capital (VC) seeks to find innovation that will disrupt existing business and by doing 
so, reap extraordinary returns on investment. Theory relative to venture capital dates back to the 
1940's (Schumpeter, 1943). However, the venture capital (debt for equity swap) type of investment 
appears to date back to the ancient Assyrians circa 1800 BC (Gardiner, 2006 pp. 159). However, the 
ancient Assyrian form was not integrated with modern open-outcry markets. Bankers such as J.P. 
Morgan were major investors in Edison and Tesla, performing the venture capital function, however, 
today, banking is not generally directly involved in venture capital transactions. 
Banking, contrary to what most people believe (including some regulators classically trained),
does not lend out money the bank has on deposit. Instead, banks create deposits by writing loans 
(McLeay, 2014). This is crucial to grasp in order to understand this venture banking proposal. 
1.1 Venture-capital today
There
are a range of Figure 1: Venture capital diagram 
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venture capital firms which invest in seed, startup, early, or late stage of development of a company 
prior to exit. Some VC firms perform all stages, some specialize in a specific stage and work with 
other firms for later or earlier phases. Venture capital today participates in money creation at exit, 
when the shares of an investment are priced on the open market. Until then, either through initial 
public offering, an acquisition of other private sale, the valuation is not realized. 
Venture capital firms today solicit limited partners (LPs), typically pension funds, endowment
funds, and other large capital management funds. Many such institutional LPs have fixed fractions 
they commit to venture capital to balance their portfolios. Some qualified investors also sign up as 
LPs. With such investor commitments, the VC firm looks for ventures to invest in. Generally, the VC 
firm will request that money be transferred from an LP only when a deal is ready, as their clock starts 
when LP funds are transferred. While many VC firms attempt to go from investment to exit in 5 years,
a 10 year cycle is more realistic. 
With rare exceptions, venture capital today is dominated by VC firms where partners in the 
firm contribute 1% or less of funds under management. A few funds are operated from the money of 
partners alone. The compensation structure of a typical VC fund pays fees of 2% of fund assets per 
year to the firm. When investments are closed out, 20% of the profit goes to the VC fund, which is 
referred to as “carry”. (Mulcahy, 2012)  
1.2 Historical investment banking, a prelude to venture banking
In the Schumpeterian disruption ethos of Silicon Valley's venture capitalists, banking is 
arguably the greatest disruptive innovation our world has ever seen. By the innovation of banking, 
capital was multiplied many-fold. Over time, this radical innovation that created money on demand 
through debt, has developed into modern money. Banking replaced hard money reserves with central 
banking, and hence makes banking demand driven only limited by qualified borrowers. With the 
development of modern monetary theory an accounting identity is recognized between debt balances 
and asset balances (Visser, 1991). For every credit balance on account, there is an equal and opposite 
debt balance, and vice  versa. Some would argue with this, but there is really no question that all 
credit balances originate in a debt balance somewhere. This is what a loan is – it is a note declaring 
that money now exists, and since in an accounting system, money is just accounting entries, this 
works. This is the innovation that the Medici family discovered and codified as a formality. It is 
doubtful that the Medici's discovered it for the first time, as there are indications that Rome may have 
had some form of what we call banking (Temin, 2004). It is also possible that certain ancient societies
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had something along the lines of banking, as credit and credit money appears to predate hard money 
tokens (Graeber, 2014). 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, investment banks were used as a vehicle for wealthy 
investors that functioned similarly to what a venture capital firm does today.  Such banks pooled the 
capital of a group of partners, and then made their investments as loans to real enterprises, using their 
capital as the reserves of the bank. This gave them the leverage that banking creates. However, over 
time, what investment banks did expanded and evolved into the current day investment bankers, 
whose largest single activity has been finance of finance (Korten, 2009, p.21). Serious abuses of 
banking leverage that fueled the stock market crash of 1929 led to regulation that virtually ended 
banks as venture-capitalists. This proposal defines a new form of banking that directly finances real-
economy new ventures. But this is not really new, except in certain  details. In concept it harks back to
a century ago. 
1.3 Kraken banking money creation
A. A bank issues a loan to a borrower. 
B. The bank purchases a derivative to act as
insurance against default on the loan. 
C. The bank then books this insured valuation of
the loan into its capital account. 
During the years of run-up to the global
financial crisis of 2008, an emergent phenomenon
appeared that had both positive and negative
aspects. It was a heretofore unknown algorithm for
creating money in the banking system (Hanley,
2012).  I named this emergent phenomenon the
Kraken, and it's enabling method the Default
Insurance Note (DIN).  
This new money multiplier produces logarithmic curves that do not converge. What the 
logarithmic graph in figure 3 shows is that capital available is only capped by real-world limitations 
on capacity when investment-loan insurance underwriting is available. 
 The Kraken curves in figure 3 are described by equation (1) below (Hanley, 2012).
   
Figure 2: Money creation cycle of Kraken 
banking
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Where: R = deposit reserve fraction, 
i1, i2…  ik= iteration number on loans/deposits, k being the series end term
n = iteration limit, I = insurance price as fraction
O = 1 + origination fee fraction of loan (generally charged as “points”) 
T = tranche fraction insured. 
Figure 3: Kraken curves, log scale. Shows values of 
m, for k = 1 to 10. (Red, lower line) R=5%, (Blue, 
upper line) R=2.5%. (R=Reserve ratio)  Reproduced 
from fig. 3 (Hanley, 2012).
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1.4 Classical banking money creation review
Contrast the log-scale behavior of figure 3 with the classical banking multiplier's asymptotic 
behavior in figure 4, which has 1/R as its limit, where R is the reserve fraction. Thus, in classical 
thinking, a reserve ratio of 5% yields a multiplier asymptote of 20 times reserves. In the real world, 
banks make loans based on their Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital (Bank, 2016) which forms the reserves they 
have. That capital belongs to the bank and its principal owners, and is at risk. So, a newly formed 
bank can make loans based on its capital reserves, and doesn't need any deposits. 
In the modern world of banking, things are even more flexible. In theory, unlimited capital is 
available from the central bank. A bank can make a loan and has 2 weeks to settle. Reserves can be 
borrowed from the central bank after loans are made. However, access to those loans is dependent on 
the central bank (for instance, the Federal Reserve) oversight.  In practice banking is limited by 
regulations that tend to direct bankers into hard assets rather than value creation. This is quite odd the 
more one studies economics, because manufacturing and services (that people need or want) is where 
“real economy” value-creation occurs (Schumpeter, 1943). Hard assets like real estate inflate in price 
without creating new value once they are built. So we see banks as both enablers of rent extraction, 
and as rentiers themselves. Rentiers charge for access to an asset without creating any value.  Venture-
capital falls into a category considered high-risk, even though risk is actually quite acceptable on 
broad portfolios. 
Figure 4: Classical banking multiplier that assumes some original reserve money. Typically, this 
would be gold or silver, although in reality, banks violated reserve relationships long ago. 
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Almost half a century before the creation of central banks such as the Federal Reserve, 
Thomas Tooke reported that gold reserves no longer functioned as they were supposed to in the Bank 
of England, and the bank had little practical interest in gold or silver. (Tooke, 1844) This provided a 
foundation to the later formalization of the abandonment of precious metals, and replacement with the
central bank system that could provide as much reserve as necessary. 
1.5 Basel accords and insured asset capital
The exponential mechanism shown in figure 3 is possible because of regulation that allows 
insured assets as capital (Division, 2016), which is consistent with Basel accords. This mechanism 
can, if properly applied, make increased capital available, up to the limit of the real-economy to 
utilize it1. This represents a secondary method of money creation that bypasses central banks as 
arbiters of reserves. 
1.6 BACPA and derivative instruments resolution
A significant feature of using derivative instruments to insure loans is that the owner of the 
derivative can have instant resolution in case of default on the note. First appearing in the United 
States in 1982, safe-harbor bankruptcy code provisions put the claims of derivative holders first, 
granting them the right to terminate and complete transactions immediately upon bankruptcy of a 
counterparty (Gilbane 2010). Thus, derivative holders have the right to immediate foreclosure on 
underlying assets. These safe-harbor protections cover forward, commodity, and security contracts; 
and also cover repurchase and swap agreements. All other claims in bankruptcy are given an 
automatic stay and must wend their way through the courts. With the passage of public law 109-8, or 
BACPA, in 2005 (Grassley 2005), these provisions were clarified and strengthened to ensure newer 
instruments would be covered. 
1.7 Misapplication of Kraken mechanism
What came to light in the aftermath of the 2008 GFC was a problem with AIG–Major Banks 
(e.g. CitiGroup, Bank of America, et al.). First, that this logarithmic growth mechanism existed; 
second, that it had been misapplied – aimed at a sector (real estate) that did not create new utility 
value along with increasing price valuation (Hanley, 2012); and third, that a method by which the 
Federal Reserve implicitly monitored activity did not work with this new mechanism because the 
banks didn't need to go through the Federal Reserve to replenish reserves in order to make loans. I 
1 The “real economy” is the productive economy of goods and services that have utility value to people. Pushing 
money into the real economy beyond it's ability to create utility value creates a bubble to one extent or another. 
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believe that development of the Kraken banking mechanism was accidental, an unplanned emergent 
phenomenon that came about between the major banks and underwriters offering CDS contracts – 
AIG primarily. 
2 Venture banking 
This proposal assumes no access to a central bank's reserve mechanism. As discussed above, 
the asymptotic classical banking multiplier (1/R where R = reserve fraction) no longer operates in the 
way assumed in classical banking because of the invention of reserve banking around the turn of the 
20th century. (e.g. Federal Reserve Bank, Bank of England, European Central Bank, etc.). However, 
this venture-banking proposal is designed to function without access to a central bank except for 
settlement purposes. This is intentional, because this is a new concept and banking regulators are 
conservative, so it will take considerable time before venture-banking is viewed in the same way other
banking is. Consequently, it was required that I discuss multiplier dependent banking above. 
I propose that a new venture bank utility (VBU) be created as a utility service instead of each 
venture-bank organizing itself separately.  The VBU's services would be paid for by fees assessed on 
Figure 5: Proposed venture capital banking system. Venture bank utility (VBU) is 
paired with an underwriter issuing default insurance notes (DINs).The clients of 
the VBU are venture capital firms. 
Default Insurance Notes to Implement Venture Banking Page 10 of 37
the venture bank sub-entities.  The concept is similar to that of Mastercard, which exists solely to 
process credit card transactions2. I do not, in this proposal, account for such fees. 
This venture bank utility (VBU) system, diagrammed in figure 5, is intended to simplify the 
process of opening a bank for use by venture capital firms. The way this would work is that an 
investor or group of investors would deposit their money into the VBU, and the utility would handle  
the overhead of operating as a bank. 
An underwriting entity parallel to the VBU would write the derivative contracts to insure the 
loans made by the investor's banks. This could be a department of the VBU, or it could be a separate 
entity depending on the regulatory environment where the VBU operated. Default insurance notes 
(DINs) insure as much of the investment loans as needed by the venture banks. 
In my conception, a VBU would operate as a not-for-profit corporation owned in partnership 
by the venture-capital firms that joined it. This would require joining fees and the member venture 
banks would participate in a similar manner to the way current commercial banks run the Mastercard 
clearing house. 
The creation of a VBU system has some challenges, but fundamentally the VBU is a matter of
execution. The major questions arise for the DIN derivatives, because it is necessary to define how 
these instruments will work, and it is the DIN that is the key support to this new banking variant. 
2.1 Winnowing of Venture Banks
Unlike stock picking on exchanges, the past performance of venture capital funds appears to 
be correlated with future results (Mulcahy, 2012). Consequently, it is worth considering that a well 
run VBU may perform periodic evaluations that I would expect to begin around 5-10 years. The 
object of these evaluations would be to decide whether a specific venture bank should be wound 
down, and removed from future participation in the VBU. Figure 7 shows returns for the large 
Kauffman venture capital portfolio. While some degree of losses can be tolerated if each of these 
funds were operated as a venture bank within a VBU, ending future relationship with poor performers 
on the lowest quartile of figure 7’s graph may improve future earnings for the VBU as a whole. 
However, winnowing is not necessary, and there are valid arguments against it. Primary 
among those arguments is that as we will see, venture banking can tolerate significant average losses 
(~50% ) on investments and still stay in the black, making similar returns to venture capital today 
2 It may be wise to diversify this banking mechanism in multiple countries in an effort to prevent complete 
dependence on the regulators of one country. 
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(Hanley, 2018). What this means is that ventures are possible that would otherwise not be. In the long 
run, this will probably benefit society. 
2.2 Regulatory limits on Venture Banking 
In the United States, the regulations most pertinent are mostly contained in section 2020.1 of 
the Commercial Bank Examination Manual of the Federal Reserve (Division, 2016). These 
regulations change from time to time based on legislation and any agreements created by the Basel 
Committee. The Basel Committee is hosted by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (Basel, 
2016). Nations participating in the international banking system have regulations conforming to BIS 
similar to US regulations. 
For banks that are members of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) system, 
requirements are more stringent. Disclosure that the bank is making equity investments is required, 
and current regulations recognize that this activity is more common. The securities involved here 
would be equity investments, and, as such, bookable as Tier 1 capital at fair value to the extent they 
are realized. A key element of my proposal is how to create a credible realization mechanism 
through public market valuation of venture bank investments prior to exit. I think the DIN 
could potentially perform that function, because it represents a kind of futures contract.  
The most common category of venture bank securities would be Type III, and these should 
not exceed more than 10% of capital to any single obligor. For this proposal, obligors greater than 
10% should not generally be the case. A venture bank should also be able to create portfolios that 
would be Type V securities which can go to 25% of capital for each such security. 
“The supervisory guidance in SR-00-9 on private equity investments and merchant banking 
activities is concerned with a banking organization's proper risk-focused management of its 
private equity investment activities so that these investments do not adversely affect the safety 
and soundness of the affiliated insured depository institutions.” (Division, 2016) 
The focus of compliance for this venture bank entity will be on developing broad portfolios 
and showing regulators, through models and records, that the bank will not create a systemic risk 
hazard. My view is that a well run venture banking system will significantly lower overall risk, not 
raise it. A VBU system should also drive professionalization of venture-capital institutional 
operations3. 
3 What exactly would be good practices for venture capital is a topic all its own. It is an art, not a science, and 
includes factors such as connections, overall intelligence and intellectual openness and creativity that are hard to 
quantify. But there are factors such as technology viability, systems to cure problems, market size and reach that 
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2.3 Limits to the money creation multiplier of a DIN-VBU system
The Basel accords specify some critical elements for capital requirements in banking that are relevant
here. Tier 2 capital is in superior position to Tier 1 in liquidation; 15% of the Tier 1 capital and 100% 
of Tier 2 capital can be insured assets. Tier 2 capital cannot exceed Tier 1 capital, giving simple 
equations 2 and 3 that show a 47X limit on outstanding money creation. 
                    
Where: C = Initial capital,
     R = Reserve percentage. 
The 47X limit is the outcome of regulation. Those regulations were created to ensure that 
investors in the bank have sufficient assets at stake to operate the bank properly. Venture-banking is 
different from ordinary banking, however, because the primary stake for venture capitalists is in the 
investments themselves. Since this would be equally true, if not more so, in venture-banking than in 
current venture capital firms, (the rewards are higher) I think that in the long-term venture banks 
could have such regulatory limits minimized safely. This should be safe as long as the system is 
operated properly. 
This simple limit of 47X is easily exceeded inside a 10 year period within the model I have 
created which assumes investment failures will occur at the 5 year mark, and exits will occur at 10 
years. Assuming that 75% of investments don’t return capital (Ghosh/Gage, 2012)  and are written off
in 5 years, then for the second 5 year period, another 35X is available for a total of 82X. Assuming 
that investments exit at 10 years, then at 10 years another 25X is available, plus 75% of the 35X, for a
total after year 11 of 47 + 35 + 25 + 26 = 133X. Again, this presumes that venture banks would not 
have access to central bank reserves. 
do have potential metrics. 
Figure 6: Venture bank capital (Tier 1 & 2) and loan limits graph 
for R = 5%  
C
0.85
=Tier1limit → 2C
0.85
=Capital reserves limit (2)
1
R (
2C
0.85 )=Maximum loanlimit (3)
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2.4 Handling of bank deposits created by venture-bank investment-loans
The bank's demand deposits would be composed of both deposits made into it by its supported
companies when an investment loan is written, and by revenue collected by the companies invested 
in. Assuming that early companies would have burned through half of their allocated funds at any 
particular time, and that later stage companies would be making money, a perhaps reasonable 
assumption is that there would be half the invesment loans deposited in the venture bank present at 
any time. On average, ¼ of the deposits on hand would be reasonably expected to be available for 
short-term loans, and such interest that the bank paid to itself to finance its insurance premiums would
either be used for operations, or else booked into Tier 1 capital to enlarge the total loan limit. 
2.5 Optimum system—100% DIN coverage 
This system is analogous to the mechanism between AIG and the major banks where real 
estate loans were insured. Those loans became insured assets, hence, for the term of the insurance 
contract, the value of the insurance policy is assigned to the capital account, and is available for a new
loan. This provides an overwhelming surplus of Tier 1 and 2 eligible capital. In this proposed system, 
if you do the math, only 2.88% of the DINs need to be present to provide enough Tier 1 and 2 capital. 
The rest is accounted as if it were long-term savings accounts, and available to loan. However, in this 
proposal, 100% of the loan amounts are insured to satisfy regulators that the funds are completely 
safe. 
2.6 Outline of a DIN
The primary difference between a DIN and a CDS contract is that the DIN includes transfer of
equity when the underlying investment is sold or goes public. So for the seller, there are two items of 
value in the transaction, the payments received from the buyer and a claim for some amount of equity 
in the investment. There are two equity claims on the investment by the DIN: 
1. Triggers can give 100% of equity to a DIN holder. Compared to a CDS, a trigger corresponds 
to the default on a loan but is more complex, as will be discussed. 
2. IPO or sale (e.g. M&A) of the investment gives a negotiated percentage to the venture bank, 
which in the models in this paper is 50% of exit equity. (e.g. at exit, 50% of the exit equity is 
paid to the venture bank.) 
There are also other provisions of DINs that are discussed in more detail below, however, the 
primary benefits to the underwriter/seller are the premium stream and the investment equity. Both 
premiums and equity fractions can vary. 
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In a simple example, if the DIN equity is 50%, and the DIN has covered 100% of an 
investment into a company, and when the company had it’s IPO, this investment owned 20% of the 
IPO stock, then the DIN equity would be: 20% investor equity x 100% DIN coverage x 50% of DIN =
10% of the total equity in the IPO. The venture bank would receive the other 50%. There is a cost for 
using this mechanism, but that balances against the increase in funds available to use, and the higher 
return that leverage based on money creation creates. 
2.7 Requirements for participation in DIN banking
To participate in a VBU, it would be necessary for venture banks to transparently show their 
investments for use by underwriters. Optimally analysis based on these records would be public, and 
this information should be compiled by an exchange-related entity for use by underwriters and for 
other analysis.  Using these records from a pool of investment cash flows and exits, the premiums 
required can be calculated. I see these records becoming a key part of the system for setting rates, for 
both sides of the DIN transaction. 
A primary regulatory concern would be ensuring that the DIN underwriters would stay 
solvent under virtually all circumstances. A single venture bank in a VBU can fail and not crash the 
system. But failure of an underwriter could have repercussions that include bringing down all of the 
investments it has insured. I could see a period where, similarly to AIG's CDS business unit, an 
insurance company could be motivated to price their instruments below solvency for the investments 
they were insuring as a way of taking market share. It would be wise to prevent this, either by 
industry agreement, or by legislation. It is my intent that DIN premiums be flat across the industry. 
Many parties, institutional and private, should qualify for direct purchase of entire DIN 
contracts, and shares in DINs could also be sold to individuals much the way that stocks are. Some 
regulators may wish to see part of the DIN volume sold to the general public be shares in a portfolio. 
In theory this should work, as long as underwriters are prevented from dumping bad investments as 
bundled securities. Dumping bad investments could be prevented through regulation requiring that 
either all of the underwriting from an insurer (or group of insurers) for a predetermined period going 
forward, or a randomly chosen set of n unsold DIN contracts for an insurer, would be packaged into a 
security. This should prevent underwriters from using insider knowledge to make the public market 
unfair. 
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3 Venture bank modeling
3.1 Net return data source – Kauffman's set of  99 venture capital firms
The risk model is based on the published data from the 99 venture capital firms Kauffman 
invested in. Returns were compiled over 20 years for the 10 year performance shown in Figure 7.  
Each bar is the return on investment for one of the 99 venture capital firms.  All returns shown are net 
of each VC firm's 2% fee and 20% carry compensation structure. My model uses a compressed 
version of this with the same overall characteristics obtained by averaging pairs. By adding and 
subtracting from this compressed dataset, varying rates of return are modeled, all with the same 
overall spread as Kauffman's dataset. The model allows adjustments that lower and raise returns. 
Figure 7: Kauffman venture capital fund dataset. (Mulcahy, 2012) 
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3.2 Portfolio models with no LIBOR borrowing, 100% DIN coverage and 5% DIN 
premiums
3.2.1 High return portfolio 1.50 – Based on Oregon Public Employee Ret. Fund
DIN 
rate 
Classical 
Portfolio 
return
DIN Under-
writer 
investment (us-
ing year 5 as 
payout year)
DIN Under-
writer 10 year
premium 
earnings
DIN 
10 year
Net 
profit
DIN Under-
writer 10 year
return. (1.00 
= break-even)
DIN 
Underwriter 
yearly 
return
DIN 
Equity 
fraction 
5% 1.50 -4.82 54.07 49.25 11.22 27.35% 50%
Figure 8: Booking DIN value to capital account  where a classical return would be 1.50.
Figure 9: Venture funds distribution of 10 year returns for a 1.5X total portfolio. 1 = breakeven
Default Insurance Notes to Implement Venture Banking Page 17 of 37
3.2.2 Intermediate return portfolio 1.31 – Based on Kauffman funds portfolio
DIN 
rate 
Classical 
Portfolio 
return
DIN 
Underwriter 
investment 
(using year 5 as 
payout year)
DIN 
Underwriter 
10 year pre-
mium earn-
ings
DIN 
10 year
Net 
profit
DIN Under-
writer 10 year
return. (1.00 
= break-even)
DIN 
Underwriter 
yearly return
DIN 
Equity 
fraction 
5% 1.31 -8.43 50.14 41.71 5.95 19.52 50.00%
Figure 10: Booking DIN value to capital account  where a classical return would be 1.31.  Note 
that a little less money is made here than at either 1.10 or 1.50 classical portfolio's return. This is
because of DIN payoffs. 
Figure 11: Venture funds distribution of 10 year returns for a 1.31X total portfolio. 1 = breakeven
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3.2.3 Low performance portfolio 1.10 – Based on Prequin median net multiple returns bottom
tertile, all private equity, 2000-2015. 100% DIN coverage, 5% DIN premium
DIN 
rate 
Classical 
Portfolio 
return
DIN 
Underwriter 
investment 
(using year 5 as 
payout year)
DIN 
Underwriter 
10 year pre-
mium earn-
ings
DIN 
10 
year 
Net 
profit
DIN Under-
writer 10 year
return. (1.00 
= break-even)
DIN 
Underwriter 
yearly 
return
DIN 
Equity 
fraction
5% 1.1 -13.84 44.23 30.39 3.2 12.32% 50.00%
Figure 13: Venture funds distribution of 10 year returns for a 1.10X total portfolio. 1 = breakeven
Figure 12: Booking DIN value to capital account where a classical return would be 1.1.  
Eventually, as returns drop, the DIN underwriter loses their shirt, so DIN premiums may benefit 
from some flexibility, perhaps including post-hoc adjustments under certain scenarios. 
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3.3 Default insurance notes graphs
3.3.1 100% DIN Relationship of  total 10 year classical return to venture-bank returns
What we see here is that returns are protected due to insurance protecting capital, and 
returning the book value of each venture investment loan that fails. The shape of this graph shows a 
perverse incentive for the venture bankers.  Since the DINs are derivatives and immediately 
enforceable, they cannot be litigated or qualified in the way of normal insurance.  
Figure 14: At 5% DIN premium and 50% equity for 100% DIN coverage. Shows net 10 year 
total return varying what the return of a conventional portfolio would have been. Shading 
indicates normal range of returns for large VC portfolios. Graphs for 30X and 43X MOC. 
Break-even at 1.0. A conventional total return cutoff of 1.50 was selected because this was the 
highest actual large portfolio found. Above 2.0 however, returns become quite high. 
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3.3.2 Relationship of total 10 year classical return to 10 year DIN return
DIN return is calculated by dividing total return by the amount of payoff money paid out, 
adjusted for time and cost of money. This shows that at the low end, the simple formula of 5% per 
year premiums and full payouts, with the same level of equity sharing do lead to losses. But in the 
more normal range returns are very good. It is necessary to improve the DIN formula to ensure DIN 
returns are strong even at the low end. This is done by having a clawback lien rider that makes up 
losses. The clawback lien creates a steadily rising curve for the venture-banks as discussed separately 
in “The perverse incentive for insurance instruments that are derivatives: solving the jackpot problem 
with a clawback lien for default insurance notes” (Hanley 2017). 
Figure 15: DIN underwriter's return. Breakeven = 0  Since the average VC fund returns 
approximately 1.0 over 10 years, this graph indicates a good business, provided that the firms the
underwriters take over are liquidated in a manner matching to the Mulcahy data. 
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4 DIN contracts – Market, structure, and operations. 
4.1 Default insurance note derivatives market
The primary counterparties to a DIN contract would be venture bankers who would buy DINs
in order to insure some fraction of their loans.  DINs would be potential assets suitable for resale in 
the event a venture capital group decides to dissolve.  Additionally, creditors could purchase a DIN to 
avoid going through bankruptcy court for collections. When triggered due to failure, the DIN becomes
an instrument for handing over the DIN's equity share of the company in return for a cash payment.
A robust market would include secondary parties who could be interested in buying for 
investment purposes. DIN instruments would be a way for the general public to participate in long-
term venture capital investments. This market for secondary parties may not be strictly required as 
there is no open market for CDS contracts – it is all off-exchange. However, it is my opinion that an 
open outcry exchange market is critical. 
4.2 Some elements of the proposed DIN contracts may not be practical 
A key aspect of the DIN type of instrument is that any metrics need to be black and white, 
easily seen as true or false. Law dictates the speed with which these instruments are exercised and 
prevents litigation from taking place. It is unwise to have overly complex clauses that leave room for 
subjective interpretation because the courts might get involved and rule that such an instrument was 
 
Figure 16: DIN derivatives market diagram. The interactions with buyers that apply to  primary 
underwriters can also apply to secondary underwriters, provided that audit requirements are 
complied with. 
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no longer properly classed as an ordinary derivative.  That, in turn would cause the collapse of the 
whole system.  
However, I present what is likely to be a superset of contract provisions so that readers can 
implement DIN contracts. Consider this strong guidance. 
4.3 Open-outcry public market 
An open market provides for transparency and fairness. An open market makes it possible for 
the general public to participate along with institutional investors and provide more liquidity.  And  an
open-outcry market creates a mechanism by which the underlying stock value of non-public 
companies could be valued. This mechanism could provide an acceptable anchor for venture-bank 
loan activity by means of a market-based valuation, provided that underwriters are prevented from 
withholding what they know to be the best investments and selling off the worst performers.  
4.4  DIN concepts 
The two-party scenario assumes that there is an issuer (the underwriter), and that the buyer 
(the venture bank) would only have one interest, getting paid in the case of a trigger. The 
underwriter's side expects to collect premiums and then equity at exit, or else pay off the cash value of
the note to the buyer when a trigger occurs and take over 100% of assets underwritten. 
Triggers are defined in detail below. Potential triggers are: Non-payment of premium, 
bankruptcy, turning down a bona-fide offer to buy, and exit from the investment.  
The original buyer side of the DIN coverage loosely corresponds to a put in options trading. It
gives the holder the right to “put” the underlying assets to the DIN holder and get paid at an agreed 
upon price. The original underwriter's side of the DIN coverage similarly corresponds to a call in 
options trading. It gives the holder the right to obtain equity or equivalent cash when an investment is 
exited. 
From here on, I will refer to these as the put and call sides of the DIN. However, unlike 
standard put and call contracts, these would be the two sides of the same contract. The put side is the 
original buyer, the investor. The call side is the underwriter, who collects premiums and equity. 
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4.5 DIN premiums and term
A typical DIN would pay a premium annually, with a nominal term of 10 years and an 
option to extend annually by the purchaser, if needed4. It is necessary that DINs be extendable 
because evidence from venture capital shows that significant venture holdings exist as long as 17 
years later. A DIN premium level would be pre-negotiated, not subject to unexpected changes by 
the issuer nor subject to yearly renegotiation should a buyer’s market develop5. For the 
underwriter, it is important to prevent a convexity trap developing in which the venture bank 
renegotiates on ventures that go well, and and holds on ventures that go badly. This may be an 
area for regulation to intervene to protect the industry from itself. 
To cancel the DIN and remove the encumbrance on the equity of the investment, a payment 
would need to be made, negotiated with the seller of the contract. But normally, the purchaser of the 
DIN must pay their agreed upon premiums, equity, or cash in lieu of equity, to the DIN issuer.  The 
nominal premium used in my modeling is 5% per annum, and the returned equity is 50% of the DIN 
coverage. Lower premiums can be used with increased exit equity, however, the lower the premium, 
the higher the carrying cost of payoffs, which cuts into exit profitability for the venture bank. 
Premiums higher than 5% can become problematic, and 5% or less is  adequate for good financial 
performance . 
4.6 Investments held for more than 10 years. 
As seen in figure 17, another issue is DIN contracts that extend out beyond the 10 year 
window of my current modeling. I could conceive of a DIN which would raise the exit equity for each
year beyond 10 years in order to compensate for DIN carrying cost, possibly at a lower rate, however 
this has not yet been modeled.  Alternatively, it could be possible for a pseudo-exit in a very long-term
investment to occur, in which the venture bank, or the firm invested in, pays off the underwriter at a 
level both consider reasonable, perhaps with an arbitrator. I could conceive of a DIN contract that put 
an upper limit of 10 or 15 years on the term, and required a valuation followed by payment in such 
cases. There are, after all, completely viable firms that have excellent reasons for staying private, and 
4 In practice, a DIN could be priced on a yearly, quarterly, monthly or some other basis. In my modeling, for 
simplicity, I used 12 month pricing, basing this on LEAPS contracts. The requirement that matters is that, once 
issued, the policy cannot be canceled, and the pricing is predictable within some fairly narrow limits. 
5 An exception to pre-negotiation could occur if a state regulator emerges. This is what would happen if the parties 
could enter negotiations each year (or possibly 2 or 5 years) on the price of a DIN. Because the DIN would have 
to be purchased, an outside regulator would be necessary to set rates.  I am against having a regulator intervene in
this market, except to force contracts to be fixed from the start. Both venture banks and underwriters would be 
vulnerable to arbitrary rulings, and to the sometimes political nature of insurance regulation.   
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there are mechanisms such as bonds for raising money to execute an internal buyout. The overall goal 
should be that the DIN business be protected from losses, and venture-banks be given as much 
latitude to operate as reasonably possible. 
4.6.1 Packaging investment portfolios 
Investment portfolios should be set up that package a group of investments. For instance a set 
of venture bank loan-investments over a 1 year period would be grouped and accounted for as a set as 
they mature. When a DIN payout  for an investment loan occurs for an investment in that set, that 
payout would normally be held for the balance of the agreed upon time period to close out that group. 
After closeout of the set, the clawback fraction would be paid back to the underwriter. I would expect 
the normal close out period to be 10 years. However, as seen above, some fraction of investments do 
not exit on schedule. Should this be the case, then the alternative of folding those into a rolling 
portfolio may be helpful. 
In this alternative, a venture bank's assets would be managed as a single, rolling portfolio of 
sub-portfolios. Bona-fide ventures that are unable to exit on schedule could be moved into another 
portfolio, and a substitute of a similar venture in terms of monetary valuation that has a closer exit 
date could replace it. If this were done, then DIN payouts would generally be released collectively as 
fractions as the portfolios closed out. In general, I am in favor of as much flexibility as possible for 
both sides when that flexibility improves the overall stability of the system and improves scheduled 
liquidity. Time squeezes are an enemy of stability and orderly markets. 
Figure 17: Kauffman—Percentage of non-liquidated assets in venture funds, 22 of 99. (Mulcahy, 
2012)
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4.7 Types of DINs
All DIN contracts should be registered on an exchange that records the deal they insure, the 
size and terms. This does not necessarily need to be public information, but it should be available to 
underwriters, venture banks, and analysts. Regular reports should be publicly available, and the data 
should be freely available to any analyst that is bona-fide and willing to abide by whatever privacy 
provisions are decided upon. 
Primary DIN – Issued by an underwriter and sold to the original investor, typically a venture 
capital banker to insure a loan. This DIN registers the underlying equity investment, the banker, and 
the loan. 
Secondary DIN – A second underwriter may issue a secondary DIN referencing the primary 
DIN held, and sell it to the issuer of the primary DIN.  When the primary DIN is triggered, this 
propagates back to the referencing DIN.  Consequently, it is required that a secondary DIN reference 
its primary, and that the primary reference it's secondary.  Having these references recorded on the 
exchange makes it possible to evaluate the true outstanding value of DINs, and determine which party
is the ultimate beneficiary. I address this matter because CDS contracts have operated this way in an 
effort by banks (which acted as underwriters) to spread risk. However, this has resulted in notional 
value of CDS contracts that are multiples of the loans they insure and there is no way to track what is 
real and what is not. 
A regulator could decide that secondary DIN contracts should not exist for the sake of 
simplicity. However, as above, I generally favor flexibility if it should improve stability. That is the 
primary question that should be answered. If there are secondary DIN contracts, will they improve 
stability and scheduled market liquidity, while lowering system risk? 
4.8 The need for triggers and a clawback lien in an adversarial relationship
There is an inherent adversarial relationship between venture bankers seeking DINs and 
underwriter-issuers of DINs. An obvious fraud strategy is to package portfolios of bad investments 
and sell them off to unsuspecting suckers, while retaining the DINs. This way the fraud perpetrator 
gets paid off if the suckers lose – after recovering their capital in the sale. This strategy was pursued 
by the major banks against AIG in the context of home loans. Court records show that banks appear to
have sought unqualified borrowers, written loans that should go bad, packaged those loans into 
tranched securities, sold those securities, and retained the CDS contracts (Wyatt, 2011). And since 
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DIN contracts are derivatives, AIG could not implement a claims process. DINs are also vulnerable to
the same strategy of “easy money” that could bankrupt the underwriter.  
Consequently, to address this problem on the purchaser side of a DIN, the DIN must be 
required to transfer with the underlying investment if it is sold off early by a venture bank6. It is vital 
that this principle never be violated or the system will come crashing down sooner or later. It is also 
important that DINs never be sold that can be disconnected from the underlying investment by any 
other means. 
A primary fraud strategy for a DIN purchaser is to make investment loans and instead of 
trying to minimize losses on the bottom 80% of their portfolio – the fraudulent venture banker could 
intentionally wreck lesser performing companies to trigger default faster, and increase the net losses 
to the underwriter. This results in DIN contracts requiring a more features than the timeworn CDS 
contract. The DIN must have triggers that the underwriter can use, and it must end with a clawback 
lien that creates a claim on the assets of the receiver (Hanley 2017; Hanley 2018). 
4.9 DIN triggers
The call side of the DIN is the underwriter's side. The put side of the DIN is the venture 
bank’s side. For a trigger, except for the final exit or bankruptcy of the investment, either the qualified
holder of the call side of the DIN can pay the value of the note and take 100% of the equity, or  else 
accept more equity or a new cash payment so that the trigger will not be exercised. Alternatively, after
being informed that the trigger event has occurred, the call side of the DIN could simply allow it to go
by. 
My preferred conception is that all of the triggers would be optional to exercise, except for the
underlying investment’s bankruptcy/shutdown and exit. Other triggers within DINs would have time 
limits. Starting points on time limits can be tied to events to make them more flexible.  
For all of these triggers except for final exit or bankruptcy, the underwriter can pay off the 
note (exercise a right to call) and take over the venture bank's insured interest in the company, or else 
require another payment from the buyer to prevent exercise. 
4.9.1 Failure to pay premiums
Should a DIN purchaser fail to pay a premium without agreement of the DIN holder, then 
the equity in the investment immediately transfers to the DIN holder, and the buyer’s accounts 
6 Venture banks could be required by regulation not to sell, however, again, I favor flexibility because ability to sell
should improve overall market stability as long as this specific perverse incentive problem is addressed. 
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can be raided to collect any penalties in the DIN. There needs to be a clear mechanism for 
notifications, what constitutes a valid payment, and provisions for inability to pay due to factors 
beyond the control of the purchaser. For instance, it may be in the interest of the underwriter to 
negotiate some other form of payment, such as an increase in exit equity, if the inability to pay is 
the result of a temporary banking crisis or other unusual market condition. 
4.9.2 Bankruptcy filing by the company invested in
Bankruptcy is an automatic trigger that puts the DIN holder's interests ahead of any other 
party. 
4.9.3 Receipt of an offer to buy, where the venture bank wishes to turn the offer down 
Startup companies receive offers to buy. It is common to turn down the first offer, or even 
several offers. Mulcahy, et al. identified failure to accept good offers (usually the first offer) as a 
significant cause of lower returns on investment in venture-capital funds. A DIN might not have this 
feature, however, that might entail a difference in premium.  If this feature were present, the 
underwriter could have the option to take possession of the equity, accept the buyout offer, and pay 
the venture bank its half of the equity that is above the DIN value.  
4.9.4 Failure to inform in a timely manner that a trigger event has occurred 
Without the investor providing this information, the basic trust is violated. It is inevitable that 
some venture bank will fail to inform by oversight. Either way, this is a trigger that allows taking 
possession of the venture bank’s equity stake in some pre-negotiated manner. 
4.9.5 Exit of the investment 
This would always transfer to the holder of the call side of the note the fraction of the equity 
defined by the DIN. No payout is made by the underwriter. 
4.10 The clawback lien – key to removing perverse incentive to defraud: 77/23
When a DIN contract is paid out to a venture bank, the final stage of the derivative instrument 
is the establishment of a clawback lien against the assets of the venture bank. The clawback lien has 
first position for payment by the venture bank. The clawback lien only applies to the difference 
between the insured investment loan amount and the valuation of the equity accepted by the 
underwriter. It is important that underwriters allocate a fair value to the equity they acquire in the 
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insurance swap because this is the incentive for venture banks to maximize the value of every 
investment in their portfolio. 
There are three ways I see reasonable for an underwriter to operate. 
A. Simple clawback without a claims process. In this option, the insurer pays the cash value of
the DIN, and takes 100% of the equity in the investment. The clawback specifies that the venture bank
must pay back 77% of the insurance payment, with interest, when the portfolio of companies this 
investment loan belongs to exits. Until that time, the bank has full use of the 77%. The venture bank 
has the 23% free and clear. 
B. Clawback with a claims process. Here, the clawback specifies 100% payback to start. The 
insurer performs a claims process at their option on the investment over a 3 month period, and the lien
has a contractual clause that gives the underwriter transparency into the entire history of the 
investment loan and the investment that the venture bank holds. The underwriter now owns the entire 
equity of the investment, and it should have special right of audit of the investment, provided that it 
does not interfere unreasonably with operations. Should the underwriter determine that a violation of 
its terms has occurred, it may demand the 23% reserve share from the venture bank and recover 100%
of its payout at portfolio exit. If there is no violation, then the venture bank releases the 23%, and the 
77% clawback is owed. 
C. Clawback with claims for some limited fraction of the portfolio. An underwriter can 
monitor its overall operations by using a statistical quality control method to examine a limited 
number of the payouts it makes. The fraction could be predetermined against the venture bank’s 
portfolio. This method should result in significant cost savings for the underwriters, as claims 
examinations could be quite involved. Optionally, a version of this method could be to implement the 
simple system (A) and just audit a statistical sample of its payouts so it has valid analysis.  
One may ask why a clawback lien should exist at all if most of it will be given back to the 
underwriter? The purpose of the DIN is to satisfy banking regulators that the insurance policy will  
pay off the loan in full should there be a shortfall in the investment return. The payout will remain 
with the venture bank for the duration of the portfolio it belongs to. So the venture bank will have use 
of the underwriter's full payment until exits close out the investment set. There will probably be 
instances of venture banks that have small portfolios and none of their investments pan out. This 
would mean that this bank would either fail, and all of its assets would go to the underwriter, or it 
could be required to combine its portfolio with others. This is the logic of the VBU which operates 
one bank but contains many smaller venture bank operations within it that it runs operations for. 
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From figure 18 it should be obvious that any fiduciary that sees that their best efforts at a 
large portfolio will do worse than any other strategy, including crashing everything, will attempt 
to increase returns by sabotaging investments. A perverse incentive similar to this is what caught 
AIG in the global financial crisis. The second factor that sealed AIG’s fate was that they had not 
constructed a claims process that could work within a derivative environment. 
4.10.1 Claim area: Failure of reasonable diligence by venture bank 
To have a case of diligence failure requires formalization of areas of proper diligence and 
matters that require disclosure. In general, these would include failure to disclose: clear violations of 
science, physics, causality or mathematics; whether there is clearance to practice (IP clearance) and if 
not, what potential problems could exist7; reasons for believing the team has the skills to carry out the 
venture; background of relevance – qualifications and experience; criminal charges or convictions of 
significance; range of market size; market reach strategy feasibility; and future value range projection.
The intention here is not to create a set of “gotcha” clauses. Entrepreneurship is an art, not a science, 
and there are often gray areas. Sometimes a technology is not fully understood. For instance, how 
7 Clearance to practice is a gray area with intellectual property in many cases because of overlapping patents, and 
patents that in some cases should not have been issued. Emphasis should be on clarity of what is known, and 
straightforward discussion of possible problems and cost to handle them. (e.g. A budget of $X per potential 
litigation.) 
Figure 18: Graph of venture bank returns with and without 
clawback. The trough in the 0% clawback graph is where the 
Kauffman portfolio lands. Reproduced from fig 11A (Hanley, 
2018) 
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SSRI drugs exert their effect is still a matter of debate, however, clearly these drugs do have value. 
There will be instances where a technology that is not fully understood does not pan out, but there 
was enough reason to think it could that it was worth the try. Holding or lacking  academic/formal 
qualifications does not mean that someone can or cannot build a company that delivers a technology. 
Conversely, a claimed technology that depends on using the spin of photons would not be 
debatable, because we know that photons don’t have spin. Similarly, if the total market is relatively 
small, it would not be debatable that figures that overshoot it are likely. If some demographic will cost
too much to reach by any known method, that would also not be debatable. 
The intent is to provide a recourse in the case of egregious failure to understand the venture 
that is being invested in, and failure to disclose the risks to the underwriter. This should be different 
from the case when a venture capitalist makes the occasional mistake, or things don’t work out as 
planned for reasons beyond their control. In addition, it is not uncommon for a venture to find out it 
can make money in a way it did not plan on, and the original target doesn’t pan out. Pivots are a sign 
of a good team. 
4.10.2 Loss of key personnel 
During important periods, the loss of key personnel can lead to failure. Depending on 
disclosure, and whether it is possible to get key person insurance for a reasonable cost, this could 
potentially be grounds for a claim. This type of loss may or may not include malfeasance by 
personnel. (e.g. filing of criminal charges, or similar “morals clause” factors.) 
4.11 DIN operations
A DIN can be written after, or simultaneously with, an investment made by a venture bank in 
a company. The venture bank's collateral is the equity in the company received for their investment. 
An underwriter may write a DIN that encumbers some fraction of venture bank equity or all of it8. In 
practice, I expect that the DIN and investment loan would usually be made simultaneously, and that 
100% of the loan would be covered. 
4.12 Secondary market 
The conceptual structure of DIN instruments could generate interest on the call side. On the 
call side (the underwriter), sales of such instruments by the original issuer to qualified buyers would 
8 There is also the possibility of selling bare call DIN instrument shares. These could be sold by the venture-bank 
at a discount. This instrument would get no equity in a trigger scenario. The instrument would collect some 
equity value at closeout. 
Default Insurance Notes to Implement Venture Banking Page 31 of 37
allow those buyers to profit by accepting follow-on payments from purchasers on the put side. They 
could also seek to profit by collecting on the equity promised by the DIN buyer at exit.
Breakup of the call side into bite-size shares, would allow the participation of members of the 
public in the call side of the secondary market who otherwise could not afford the payout risk. In my 
conception, a controlling interest of 30% or more of the total call valuation should be retained by the 
underwriter, or sold to an exercise competent entity. The public buyer would have access to the make-
up of the portfolio of companies that the DINs insure, or when buying a share of a single DIN, the 
company would be defined. 
In concept, it could be possible to structure things so that the call side investors have voting 
rights exercised online that could operate if they had a quorum. An alternative, simpler, way to set up 
the voting system would be to have buyers set their default choice for the exercise of the DIN, when 
they buy. However, if I were operating the call side as the exercise competent entity, I would want to 
retain maximum flexibility to respond to conditions, without hindrance. So I recommend that public 
small share secondary market buyers assign any decision to exercise rights to the exercise competent 
entity. 
The underwriter may package DINs into a portfolio, and sell shares in that portfolio to the 
general public. Institutional, or qualified private investors may buy the call side of the DIN contract 
and transfer the DIN in toto to themselves. 
The danger of a secondary market is that an underwriter could decide to dump its worst 
investments early, and keep the better ones. Consequently, I suggest that underwriters be required to 
offer predetermined fractions of portfolios to the public, not to exceed 70% of the total. Making the 
decision before the fact will ensure that the public gets fair and equal access to the DIN instrument 
shares. 
4.13 Necessity of open market, or trading on an exchange 
There is no open market today in CDS derivatives or anything else similar to DINs as defined 
here. The advantages of such a market are significant.
 With this market mechanism, it would be possible to establish a public valuation of the 
underlying venture-bank equities. This may be critical to getting acceptance by regulators. 
 Underwriters would be able to sell off some of their risk, lowering their capital requirements.
 Secondary buyers could buy and sell their side of a DIN to speculate on start-ups success or 
failure.
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 Analysts could provide analysis and opinion. This would need to be protected in some ways, 
but the extra transparency should be beneficial overall. 
5 Summary operation of DIN instruments
The structure of a DIN typically comprises:
 Premium payments made yearly9.  Premium payments may be front-loaded or flat fee per 
year. Premiums could be fixed or floating for a portfolio.
 Pay-out triggers. Triggers for payout of the insured default amount, penalties, haircuts, and 
seizure of insured equity. 
 Exit trigger. A trigger that delivers some fraction of insured equity upon exit.
Parameters that determine cost of DINs are:
 Term – 1 year, extendable for 10 years with secondary extensions up to 15 years. 
 Exit equity – A variable value paid to the underwriter on exit. The higher the equity, the lower 
the premium. The lower the premium the greater the net negative cash flow that the 
underwriter can experience prior to exit for a specific DIN. 
 Bank rate – Bank rate is used to determine the cost of money to carry the pay-off cost of a 
DIN portfolio for the underwriter prior to portfolio exit. Bank rate is also used to calculate the 
final cost of paying back the clawback liens to the underwriters with interest. 
6 Audit of DIN instruments
DIN instruments have potential risks that are different than most. Consequently, special audit 
provisions are needed.
1. Validate that contracts to insure equity in an enterprise are the type of shares claimed and 
have no issues that would render them problematic at a successful exit.
2. Validate that equity to be potentially delivered is not hypothecated or otherwise 
encumbered. 
3. Validate that venture banks are monitoring the insured companies with valid drop-in visits 
to ensure that the investments are not fictional, that investments have been put into real 
9 Alternatively, premiums could be quarterly, however, my modeling used annual payments. 
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enterprises intended to produce goods and/or services. This would include, but not be limited 
to, validating personnel, seeing premises and products in process, and monitoring milestones.
Validate that DIN underwriters have good, timely information on the underlying investment.
4. Validate that the underwriter has the capacity to monitor and administer DINs that are 
triggered, including decisions on whether to pay out or take over equity, handle equity assets 
in a timely manner, and be able to track what those assets are. 
5. Track DINS as to original issuer, purchaser, whether a DIN is a primary or secondary 
instrument, and that secondary DINs are referenced to primary and vice versa. 
6. Validate that DIN portfolio shares being sold are representative of the whole portfolio of 
the underwriter. Ensure that underwriters are not packaging their worst investments for the 
public as a way to improve their earnings, while withholding DINs that insure their best 
performing investments. 
7. Ensure that the purchaser has not sold or transferred the investment to another entity 
without first informing the underwriter, and that the put side of the DIN has not been 
separated from the loan-investment it is attached to. Doing so should make the DIN 
instrument null and void. 
8. Validate that a DIN portfolio discloses the degree of correlation of the underlying assets. 
DIN portfolios should be examined for degree of correlation, and should the degree of 
correlation of the underlying assets be higher than disclosed, strategies should be pursued to 
mitigate that risk, or the portfolio risk level modified to disclose it to  market exchanges and 
buyers. 
9. It is normal for venture-capital firms to collectively over-invest in sectors that are “hot”. 
However, when “me-too” investors over-populate a narrow sector, it is obvious that many 
will not survive. An audit will examine sectors in which a DIN portfolio is invested, and 
evaluate the multiple of the total available market (TAM) and served available market (SAM)
that is collectively invested. The multiples of the potential TAM and SAM relative to 
investments in the sector should be disclosed by the underwriter as public data.
10. Validate that the terms of DIN coverage expected by interbank lenders and regulators are 
being complied with. These terms may vary between venture banks, for instance, based on 
track record or how new the firm is.
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11. Pay attention to the rates of capital gains and corporation taxes, and what is or is not 
excluded from pre or post-tax categorization. These can have significant effects on equity 
markets, and historically, regulators have responded in ways that exacerbated or created 
problems (Gardiner, 2006, Chp. 11). 
 
7 Concluding remarks
I hope to get people thinking about new ways to approach venture financing. As a side effect, 
it should result in a significant economic boost as money creation directed into high-value real-
economy ventures occurs. 
This method should allow expansion of the meaning of venture capital by allowing longer, 
and more realistic time horizons than the common 5 year target with the J curve fiction. I also think it 
would be good for a disruptive shake up of how venture-capital operates. The VBU-DIN system 
outlined here could provide a structure that would allow various investment groups to form and pool 
resources. The process to obtain a DIN should help to improve the odds of success, and compliance 
with good practices such as the audit described should protect underwriters from the kind of gaming 
the system that occurred in the the real estate sector. The development of a strong underwriting 
business is the most important element of this proposal, and it is the keystone on which the ability to 
operate rests. 
There are inherent difficulties with individual venture-capital firms creating banks for 
themselves to operate. Aside from the extra overhead and impact on mental bandwidth taking away 
focus from deal flow, a venture-capital firm tends to make large investments as the deals become 
available, without a great deal of concern about how much that represents in their total portfolio. 
However, banks need to diversify and minimize the impact of any one investment on the bank. This is
why I created the VBU concept. 
The VBU can bridge the operations gap between the more narrowly focused venture-capital 
firms and the need for the venture banks to have a broad portfolio in order to be healthy. There are 
regulatory limits in banking on the amount that any one investment represents, typically 10%. By 
operating multiple firm's funds for them, in quasi-siloed operations within the VBU, the VBU and its 
underwriting partner can operate over a broad portfolio that represents a large ecosystem of varied 
investments. 
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There may be venture capital firms that are larger, with multiple decades of operations 
experience and a diverse portfolio of investments, that could be candidates for converting their 
investment operations over to this method, operating their own bank and underwriting. 
One could ask, why create venture banking when it is already the case that banks can create 
new deposits through loan activity? After all, current banks could do so without the burden of private 
market underwriting, and this insurance mechanism described takes half the equity. The answer to this
starts with the observation that banks do not do this today because of regulation. In the regulatory 
scheme, DIN contracts (properly implemented) prevent bad behavior by venture banks, while 
allowing regulators a very light hand. 
Much regulation has gone into creating bounds within which banks can operate because of the
inherent moral hazard of banking. Requiring underwriters to insure venture loan investments means 
that an adversarial party will have to agree. An area where venture banking could prove problematic is
for finance of finance, because such deals can present excellent returns on paper in short time scales. 
So leveraged buyouts, securitizations, financing of resale of existing assets, and similar should be 
proscribed to venture banking to prevent fueling bubbles of the type that created the 2008 crisis 
(Hanley, 2012). Venture loan underwriting should be directed to investments in enterprises that create 
new utility value or else improve efficiency. 
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9 Glossary
AIG – American International Group. A global insurance company providing insurance products to 
commercial, institutional and individual customers. They also provide mortgage insurance and 
credit default swap (CDS) contracts. 
BACPA – Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. For these purposes, 
BACPA strengthened the rights of derivative holders to collect immediately. 
Basel accords – There are three sets of banking regulations set by the Basel Committee on Bank 
Supervision. These are known as Basel I, Basel II and Basel III. 
Call – In options trading, a call contract gives the holder the right to buy an asset at a pre-negotiated 
price for some time period. For a DIN, it signals the side of the DIN that collects the assets of an 
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investment in return for payment of the insurance value to the purchaser, and collects equity at 
exit of the investment. 
CDS – Credit Default Swap. The purchaser makes premium payments to the underwriter and the 
contract insures a loan on some asset, typically a real estate loan. If the borrower defaults on the 
loan, then the purchaser is paid the face value of the contract, and transfers the asset to the 
underwriter. 
DIN – Default Insurance Note.  A proposed derivative that insures loans made by venture capitalists 
as investments, defined in this paper. This DIN contract is they key to enabling this new type of 
banking to function. 
FRED – Federal Reserve Economic Data. 
Haircut – A reduction in the stated value of an asset.
IPO – Initial Public Offering. 
IP – Intellectual property. Patents, trademarks and copyrights. 
M&A – Merger and Acquisition. 
MOC – Multiple of Original Capital.  Some amount of money is put into the bank that is its capital. 
This amount is enlarged by the Basel accords rules into the complete Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital that
is used by the bank as reserves. The total outstanding investments divided by the original capital 
placed in bank Tier 1 reserves is the MOC. See figure 6. 
Put – In options trading, a put is a contract that buys the right to force a buyer for your asset to pay a
pre-negotiated price. For a DIN, it is the right to collect the payoff amount of the insurance and 
turn over the equity of an insured investment. 
TAM – Total Available Market. 
VBU – Venture Bank Utility. This is a proposed new entity that handles the banking operations for a 
set of venture banks. See figure 5. 
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